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Abstract 
We examine the effect of political polarization within state legislatures on state bond yields.  
Defined as the ideological distance between the Democratic and Republican members of the 
state legislative chambers, political polarization captures the willingness of legislators to seek 
bipartisan compromises. We expect that states with high polarization are riskier because they 
are more likely to experience gridlock, which negatively affects economic development and 
commitment to debt service. We find that the bonds issued by highly polarized states exhibit 
significantly higher yields at issuance compared to the states with lower levels of political 
polarization. A one standard deviation increase in polarization increases bond yields by 14.7 
basis points and total interest expense by $4.3 million for an average bond issue. Furthermore, 
we find that the effect of polarization on bond yields is greater for general obligation bonds.  
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“There is one unavoidable fact about legislating in a democratic system. No single 
person, faction, or interest can get everything it wants. Legislating inevitably means 
compromising, except in the rare circumstances when consensus is so strong that one 
dominant view can prevail with ease.” 
 Robert Kaiser 2013, p. 174 
1. Introduction 
The dispersion of power in a democratic political system makes it difficult for one 
political party to make effective policy without the cooperation and support of members of the 
other party. Despite the prediction that a two-party system generates convergence (Downs, 
1957), many studies point out that political polarization has become a defining trend in 
American politics (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Shor and McCarty, 2011).1 A 2014 Pew 
Research report notes that “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological 
lines – and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive – than at any point in the last two 
decades.” This growing partisan polarization is troubling because it discourages productive 
compromise. Polarization is also concerning to market participants. Recent press indicates that 
even for relatively risk-free treasury bills, polarization has led to increases in bond yields.2 
Furthermore, a recent report by Moody’s points out that political polarization makes budget 
and financial decisions more difficult and could lead to rating downgrades for U.S. states 
(Moody’s, 2013). 
We examine whether polarization at the state legislative level influences investors’ risk 
evaluations as reflected in yields on state government bonds. Our primary tests exploit both 
cross-sectional and temporal variance in polarization using a large sample of new bond 
                            
1 See Fiorina and Abrams (2008) for a comprehensive survey of this literature. 
2 As widely reported by financial press in July, 2017, concerns over a legislative impasse for the federal government’s debt 
ceiling is estimated to have increased 3 month T-bill yields by over 10 basis points (see e.g., 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-21/game-of-twister-awaits-t-bills-as-debt-ceiling-anxiety-deepens 
accessed on Nov 20, 2017). 
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issuances by state governments between 2000 and 2014.  
We believe that political polarization within state legislatures is primarily linked to the 
cost of borrowing as default risk in two ways. First, a more polarized legislature is less likely 
to compromise across party lines and, therefore, experience gridlock (Binder 1999; McCarty 
2007). Consequently, political polarization can obstruct a state legislature’s ability to reach 
consensus on fiscal decisions. For instance, polarization in California’s legislature in 2009 led 
to a delayed budget because Republicans and Democrats could not reach a consensus on 
balanced financial operations. Similarly, Illinois is experiencing an ongoing budget impasse 
which has lasted for several years. Not surprisingly, Illinois’ lack of a budget has led to credit 
rating downgrades because it poses a threat to the timely payment of the state’s core priority 
payments, including debt service (Fitch, 2017; Moody’s, 2017; S&P, 2017). In the event of 
difficult or stressful economic cycles, a polarized legislature may have even greater difficulty 
in reaching the consensus necessary to either raise taxes or prioritize debt service3. Second, 
McCarty (2007) argues that “the most direct effect of polarization-induced gridlock is that 
public policy does not adjust to changing economic and demographic circumstances,” which 
suggests that polarization may negatively affect a state’s long-term economic development.  
Hence, even if the state’s current fiscal condition is strong, polarization could increase investors’ 
risk assessments for bonds. 
We measure political polarization using data from the American Legislatures project 
(Shor and McCarty, 2011). Defined as the average ideological distance between the median of 
                            
3 Recent commentary from Fitch ratings indicate that even for triple A rated Minnesota, political dysfunction poses a threat 
to debt service payments (Fitch, 2017). 
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the Democratic and Republican parties in the state legislative chambers, Shor and McCarty 
(2011) measure polarization using both the Project Vote Smart National Political Awareness 
Test (NPAT) and legislative roll call data from all 50 states. These data allow us to consistently 
compare political polarization across chambers (house or senate) within a state, between states, 
and across years.    
Consistent with expectations, we find a significant positive association between initial 
bond yields and political polarization, illustrating that the cost of borrowing is higher for states 
with more politically polarized legislatures. Our regression estimates indicate that a one 
standard deviation increase in political polarization is associated with a 14.7 basis point 
increase in overall bond yields at issuance, after controlling for risk factors previously identified 
in the literature. The magnitude of this effect is roughly equivalent to the benefit of credit 
enhancement (through bond insurance) in decreasing yields. For a bond issue of average size 
($280.51 million) and time to maturity (10.34 years) in our sample, a one standard deviation 
increase in polarization increases total interest expense by $4.3 million (i.e., $280.51 x 0.00147 
x 10.34).   
Consistent with debt service of general obligation bonds being more directly influenced 
by a state’s legislative environment, we predict and find that the effect of political polarization 
on yields is concentrated in general obligation bonds rather than revenue bonds for which debt 
service is tied to revenues from specific projects (e.g., a toll road). For general obligation bonds, 
we find that a one standard deviation increase in political polarization is associated with a 21.44 
basis point increase in yield at issuance. 
To better tie our findings to investors’ perception of risk, we examine whether our 
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results vary with the downgrade of bond insurers. The municipal bond market is unique in that 
a significant portion of bonds are sold with insurance provided by one of the major “monoline” 
insurers such as AMBAC and MBIA. Bond insurance guarantees principal and interest 
payments in the event of default and negates the need for investors to monitor the 
creditworthiness of state and local governments. However, during the financial crisis, the major 
bond insurers lost their triple-A ratings due to their exposure to subprime mortgages.4 The 
demand for insurance fell considerably after their initial downgrades in 2008.5 Without high-
quality insurance, bond investors have less protection from the potentially adverse 
consequences of fiscal dysfunction in state government. Using this setting, we test whether the 
effect of political polarization on initial bond yields is greater for bonds issued during the one-
year period immediately following the June 18, 2008 downgrade of the major bond insurers 
than during the one-year period immediately preceding this event. Consistent with polarization 
increasing risk, our results indicate that the effect of polarization on bond yields is stronger in 
the post-downgrade period compared with the pre-downgrade period. 
One concern related to our analysis is that our results are drive by an unspecified omitted 
variable. For this to be a concern, this omitted variable needs to be correlated with our measure 
of polarization and explain bond yields. In our survey of the determinants of political 
polarization, we believe that most explanations for polarization (e.g., gerrymandering) are 
unlikely to affect bond risk. However, economic factors (e.g., rising income inequality) may 
explain both polarization and also be correlated with bond yields. In robustness tests we find 
                            
4 See Duffie (2017) for a summary of regulatory reforms after the financial crisis. 
5 From a high of 57% insured before the financial crisis to 19% in 2008, and to 3.5% in 2012.  
(http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/123_83/bond-insurance-then-and-now-revival-of-industry-1062071-1.html. Accessed on 
Nov 21, 2017) 
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that our estimates of the effect on polarization on bond yields are unaffected by including 
controls for such economic factors. 
Our study contributes to a vast literature which examines the real effect of the political 
economy on financial markets6. However, research on the political determinants of risk in a 
municipal setting is relatively scant. Gao and Qi (2015) examine how uncertainty over 
gubernatorial elections affects municipal bonds yields7. They argue that uncertainty over which 
candidate’s economic policies will be implemented can create risk. Our study focuses not on 
the ambiguity over whose policies will be implemented but on the risk stemming from 
polarization or the lack of compromise. This study is the first we are aware of that examines 
the effect of political polarization on the cost of state government borrowing. Using a 
comprehensive sample of state-level debt, we find that polarization increases the cost of 
borrowing for state governments. Given the increasing trend in polarization, these findings have 
important implications for policy makers and the general public.   
This study also contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of borrowing 
costs for state and local governments, such as competition amongst underwriters (Kessel, 1971), 
insurance (Kidwell, Sorensen, and Wachowicz, 1987), disclosure regulation (Benson et al. 1991; 
Baber and Gore, 2008; Bloch et al., 2016), tax policy (Ayers et al., 2005), natural disasters 
(Marlowe, 2006), credit default swaps (Marlowe, 2011), liquidity risk (Marlowe, 2015), 
distance to investment banks (Butler, 2008), 8  transparency (Schultz, 2012), accounting 
                            
6 The literature is too large to summarize, however authors examine how elections impact economic policy choices (Besley 
and Case, 1995); how a lack of political competition leads to policies that hinder economic growth (Besley, Persson, and 
Sturm, 2010). 
7 Another stream of research studies political corruption and municipal borrowing costs (Butler, Fauver, and Martal, 2009); 
how fiscal institutions affect municipal bond secondary market quoted yields (Poterba and Rueben, 1999); and how fiscal 
imbalance influences the borrowing cost of municipal bonds (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2012). 
8 Similarly, Jaggi and Tang (2015) also find that distance influences corporate credit ratings and debt costs. 
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restatements (Baber et al., 2013), liquidity (Wang et al., 2008; Schwert, 2017), internal control 
deficiencies (Park et al., 2016), social capital (Li et al., 2017), tax privilege (Babina et al., 2017) 
and state policies for distressed municipalities (Gao et al., 2017). 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains background and 
hypothesis development.  Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Results are shown in 
Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. State Bond Market 
State governments issue bonds to finance public purpose projects like roads, schools, 
airports and stadiums. These bonds are generally classified into two major categories, general 
obligation bonds and revenue bonds. State-level general obligation bonds are secured by tax 
revenues which include income tax, sales tax and various excise taxes, and are typically backed 
by the full faith and credit of the issuing state. Additionally, states usually have statutory 
mechanisms which include an irrevocable and continuing appropriation for all general 
obligation debt service. These mechanisms give the state treasurer or comptroller continuing 
authority and direction to make all necessary debt service payments on general obligation bonds 
from any and all revenues and funds of the state.   
General obligation bonds contain either unlimited or limited pledges, where limited 
pledges place a cap on the ability of the issuer to levy taxes. General obligation bonds with an 
unlimited pledge theoretically allow the issuer to raise taxes to the extent necessary to support 
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debt service. The majority of state level general obligation bonds contain unlimited pledges.9  
In contrast, revenue bonds are issued to finance a particular project, such as a toll roads, and 
debt service obligations are secured exclusively by revenues of that specific project. Given the 
tax pledge, the general obligation bonds are typically viewed as more secure than revenue bonds.    
State and local government bonds are typically issued through either a negotiated 
offering or a competitive sale. In a competitive sale, bond offerings are awarded to underwriters 
based on the overall interest cost (Nauss, 1986). In a negotiated sale, an underwriting syndicate 
is selected to sell bonds to investors. Most studies suggest that the competitive bidding process 
results in lower interest costs (Benson, 1979; Simonsen and Robbins, 1996). 
2.2. Determinants of Polarization 
 The political science literature has indicated a variety of factors as possible causes for 
increasing political polarization, including a polarized electorate, gerrymandering, party 
realignment, income inequality, economic well-being, donor effects, and the media. We 
describe in more detail each cause and separate them broadly as non-economic and economic 
factors.   
2.2.1. Non-Economic Factors 
Layman and Carsey (2002) and Levendusky (2009) find that polarization may be an 
overall reflection of voters holding views more strongly aligned with their parties’ policy 
positions. Recent studies argue that the proliferation of more partisan media has made elections 
more partisan (Prior 2007), causing officials to become more aligned with partisan views for 
fear of being portrayed negatively to their political base. Special interests may also influence 
                            
9 Due to a constitutional cap on property tax, Nevada is one of few states that issue limited general obligation bonds. 
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politicians to take more partisan positions (Lessig 2011). Barber and McCarty (2015) highlight 
that a Southern realignment may explain increasing polarization. Since the 1970’s, we have 
seen more Republicans representing Southern districts. As Republicans replace more moderate 
Democrats, the average Southern Democrat that is still left is likely to be more liberal.  
Tufte (1973), Carson et al. (2007) and Theriault (2008) indicate that gerrymandering, 
or drawing congressional districts that lead to overwhelmingly partisan and safe districts, which 
frees candidates from the need to compete for more moderate votes, contributes to polarization. 
However, McCarty et al. (2006) and McCarty et al. (2009) find that polarization is not explained 
by gerrymandering. Specifically, these authors find that polarization exists even with random 
district borders. 
2.2.2. Economic Factors 
The political science literature also indicates that economic factors may contribute to 
polarization. McCarty et al. (2006) and Voorheis, McCarty, and Shor (2017) show a close 
correlation between economic or income inequality and polarization. However, Edsall (2012) 
explains that inequality is driven by economic crisis and the ensuing competition over 
diminishing resources. Therefore, polarization stems from a deterioration in economic well-
being.   
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
2.3.1. Political Polarization and Investors’ Perceptions of Risk  
Investors consider various factors in evaluating the credit quality of a state bond, 
including the issuer’s sources of income, the strength of its balance sheet, its vulnerability to 
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changing economic conditions, and the quality of its budgeting and oversight processes. Credit 
ratings are useful summary measures of state’s creditworthiness, but ratings are constrained to 
categories and tend to be untimely (Hull et al., 2004). This paper examines the political dynamic 
of polarization in state legislatures and how it affects investor’s perception of creditworthiness. 
Political polarization discourages compromise, which adversely affects a legislature’s ability 
to make timely fiscal and budgetary decisions. The risk of budget delays create uncertainty and 
may call into question the ability and willingness to pay debt service. The inability to come to 
timely fiscal decisions may adversely affect the perceived commitment to service debt. In times 
of economic distress, a highly polarized legislature may be less likely to prioritize debt service 
or raise taxes in order to fund debt service. We expect investors’ perceptions of state default 
risk are increasing in the level of political polarization within the state’s legislature, resulting 
in a positive relation between polarization and bond yields. 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, political polarization within state legislatures increases investors’ 
perceptions of default risk and, therefore, increases the yield on newly issued state 
bonds. 
 
2.3.2. Bond Types  
The majority of state bonds fall under two categories, general obligation bonds and 
revenue bonds. State level general obligation bonds are secured by a state’s tax revenues, which 
are dependent on legislative action. We expect that polarization will have a stronger effect on 
general obligation bonds because legislative impasses have direct influence over tax revenues 
and how they are budgeted and spent.   
On the other hand, revenue bonds are issued to finance particular projects such as 
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stadiums and toll roads. The principal and interest of these bonds are secured exclusively by 
project revenue streams. Revenue bonds may be influenced by the overall economic health of 
a state. However, because the security of revenue bonds is not directly tied to legislative action, 
we expect political polarization to have a less direct effect on these bonds. Therefore, we expect 
the effect of political polarization on state bond yields will be greater for general obligation 
bonds than for revenue bonds. 
  
H2: Ceteris paribus, the effect of political polarization on bond yields will be stronger for 
general obligation bonds compared to revenue bonds. 
 
 
3.  Data 
3.1. Sample Selection and Calculation of Variables  
Our sample includes 45,177 general obligation and revenue bonds issued by states 
between 2000 and 2014 as reported in the Mergent Municipal Bond Securities Database 
(Mergent). Mergent provides issue-specific information such as bond yield, bond size, issue 
size, bond offering year, bond insurance, credit rating, bond type, maturity date, optional call 
schedule, puttable, and bank qualified indicators. To control for state-level demographics that 
may affect bond yields, we use state-level data on income per capita and population from the 
United States Census. We merge these macroeconomic variables with a lag of one year from 
the bond issuance date. To control for overall interest rates, we include the U.S. Treasury bond 
yields matched to state bonds by duration and the month of the settlement date. The main 
variables used in this study are defined in Appendix A. 
Following Butler et al. (2009), we use the most recent Standard and Poor’s ratings of a 
state’s general creditworthiness as a proxy for a bond’s default risk. To facilitate regression 
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analyses, we transform bond ratings into a numeric scale ranging from 1 for AAA ratings to 10 
for BBB- ratings. See Appendix B for the complete classification scheme.  
While our primary dependent variable is bond yield at issuance as reported by Mergent, 
we also perform tests using state bond yields constructed from secondary market trading data 
for the period of June 2007 and June 2009 from the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
(MSRB) Database. MSRB provides the trade price, CUSIP number, security description, 
coupon, trade date, maturity date, an indicator showing whether the trade was initiated as a 
purchase from a customer, a sale from a customer, or an interdealer transaction. Following 
Bessembinder et al. (2009), we calculate a volume-weighted trade price for each bond on each 
date when the bond is traded. The analysis is restricted to the trades that are customer initiated 
buy orders (Downing and Zhang, 2004). We convert the price to a yield and match this to the 
Mergent dataset by CUSIP. 
3.2. Measure of Political Polarization  
Our measures of political polarization are derived from data made available by Boris 
Shor’s and Nolan McCarty’s American Legislatures Project.10 Using both survey data from 
Project Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) 11  and legislative roll-call 
voting data from all 50 states, Shor and McCarty (2011) employ a two-step process to construct 
ideal points for state legislators that are comparable across legislators, states and time. NPAT is 
a recurring national survey that asks political candidates questions related to foreign policy, 
national security, international affairs, social issues, fiscal policy, environmentalism, criminal 
justices, and so on. Because NPAT participation is voluntary, it is not completed by all 
                            
10 These data are available at https://americanlegislatures.com/. More specifically, we use dataset 4.0 released in June 2015. 
11 See website of Project Vote Smart at http://www.votesmart.org. 
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candidates. Therefore, Shor and McCarty (2011, 534) first estimate “roll-call based ideal points 
for all legislators in each state” and then “project them into the space of NPAT ideal points 
using ordinary least squares (OLS).” They then generate predicted NPAT scores for non-
respondents using state-specific regression parameters. The end result is a political ideology 
score for each legislator measured on a scale that is comparable across legislators, states and 
time. For each state-year combination, political polarization within each of the house and senate 
chambers is measured as the difference between the median ideology score of chamber 
Democrats versus that of chamber Republicans. Shor and McCarty label these polarization 
measures h_diffs and s_diffs, respectively, for the house and senate chambers. 
Because the legislative process requires approval from both the house and senate 
chambers, high polarization in either chamber increases risk of an impasse. Therefore, we 
define polarization as the greater of h_diffs or s_diffs for each state-year observation.12 Table 
1 presents summary statistics for the polarization measure. For most states, polarization shows 
an increasing trend across time. Shor and Marty (2011) indicate that missing observations for 
polarization occur when a state does not make roll call vote data available. 
<Table 1> 
State legislative sessions typically last for 2 to 9 months, usually beginning early in the 
year. We align state-year polarization measures, which reflect votes during these legislative 
sessions, with bond issuances occurring after the end of that session and before the end of the 
next session. For example, California’s 2012 legislative session ran from January 4 to August 
                            
12 Alternatively, defining polarization as the average of h_diffs and s_diffs for each state-year observation produces results 
entirely consistent with our reported results. 
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31. California bonds issued after August 31, 2012, and before the end of California’s 2013 
legislative session are matched with polarization measures for California’s 2012 legislative 
session. Bonds issued by states during years with missing polarization data are excluded from 
our sample. 
3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for regression variables. The sample consists of 
45,177 general obligation and revenue bonds issued between 2000 and 2014. The average yield 
to maturity at issuance is 3.50 percent. The average size of an entire issue and the average size 
of an individual bond issue are 280.51 million and 13.24 million, respectively (untabulated).  
The average of the natural logarithm of an individual bond issue is 15.21, and the average 
maturity is 10.34 years. The average bond rating is 2.76, which is roughly equivalent to an S&P 
rating of AA. General obligation bonds represent 71 percent of the sample. A Pearson 
correlation matrix is provided in Table 3. The significance level of correlation coefficients at 
the 5% level or better are starred. We note that the bivariate correlation between polarization 
and bond yields is negative. This is a broad reflection of the fact that bond yields have been 
decreasing over our sample period (due to overall decreases in interest rates and municipal 
default risk) while polarization exhibits an increasing trend. We examine economic and 
statistical significance in our multivariate regressions. 
<Table 2> 
<Table 3> 
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4. Results 
4.1. Bond Yields and Polarization 
We use the bond yield as our primary test of the effect of political polarization on a 
state’s default risk. Given that the typical municipal investor is a buy-and-hold retail investor, 
default risk accounts for the majority of the risk component in bond yields (Schwert, 2017). 
We use the bond-level control variables that have been used by Hastie (1972), Blackwell 
and Kidwell (1988), Kao and Wu (1994), and Nanda and Singh (2004). These include controls 
for bond size, maturity, rating, the method of sale, the type of bond, callable bonds, puttable, 
and bank qualified bonds. We include bond size as a proxy for liquidity, as in Bergstresser et al 
(2013). Longstaff (2011) emphasizes that liquidity impacts municipal bonds prices. The bond 
size is measured by taking the natural log of the principal amount of each individual bond. 
Maturity is calculated as the number of days between the maturity date and the offering date 
divided by 365. Credit rating is an assessment for the default risk of municipal bonds given by 
rating agencies, such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. Bond ratings are the 
alphanumeric conversions of ratings issued by the rating agencies. The offering type indicates 
the method of sale and takes a value of one if the issue sale is competitive and zero if the sale 
is negotiated. Insurers provide a guaranty of principal and interest payments for municipal 
bonds in the event of default. The credit ratings of bonds with insurance reflect the insurers’ 
creditworthiness instead of the state’s underlying creditworthiness. We include an indicator 
variable, insurance, which takes a value of one if the bond is insured and zero if the bond is not 
insured. We include income per capita, which is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
and population from decennial censuses as the state-level demographic controls. The natural 
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log is applied to both the income per capita and population. Information on Treasury bonds is 
collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). They are the monthly CRSP 
fixed-term indices for the periods 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 20 and 30 years. We use linear interpolation of 
the yields of the two Treasury bonds that have the next lower and higher duration relative to 
the respective state bond. We delete observations with a duration of less than one year. For 
bonds with a duration of more than 30 years, we use the 30-year Treasury yield. We also include 
both state and year fixed effects. The standard errors of the regression are clustered at the state 
level.  
To examine how political polarization within state legislatures affects the yields of state-
issued bonds, we estimate the regression shown in equation 1 using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis. The dependent variable is a state bond’s yield to maturity at the time of 
issuance. The variable of interest in this specification is polarization.   
 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑑
+ 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑+𝛽11𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
+ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +  𝜀 
(1) 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation 1. The coefficient on polarization is 
significantly positive, which is consistent with H1 that legislative polarization increases state 
bond risk and, consequently, bond yields. The results shows that a one standard deviation 
increase in polarization (0.54) is associated with a 14.7 basis point (0.273*0.54) increase in 
overall bond yields. The magnitude of the effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
polarization on yields is roughly equivalent to the estimated effect of bond insurance on yields 
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(e.g., -11.0 basis points). The entire offering size and time to maturity in our sample, on average, 
are $280.51 million and 10.34 years, respectively. This implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in polarization increases total interest expense per issue by $4.3 million (i.e., $280.51 
x 0.00147 x 10.34). 
<Table 4> 
The control variable coefficients are generally consistent with expectations. Bonds with 
longer maturities have higher yields. Bonds with higher credit ratings have lower yields because 
they have lower predicted rates of default. Yields for general obligation bonds are lower 
because they are backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing state. Bonds with insurance 
also have lower yields because they are backed by the credit worthiness of bond insurers. Bonds 
with a callable provision have higher yields because the option for an issuer to call a bond 
increases interest rate risk for investors. 
As a robustness test, we also examine the association between polarization and yield 
spreads. We examine the yield spread as an alternative way to capture the risk component in 
the pricing of municipal bonds. Schwert (2017) estimates that default risk accounts for as much 
as 84 percent of the municipal bond spread after adjusting for tax-exempt status. Tax-exempt 
bonds represent 90 percent of our sample. We replace bond yield with yield spread in equation 
1 and calculate the spread using Treasury bonds as a risk-free benchmark. We calculate the 
yield spread by subtracting its corresponding Treasury yield from the state bond’s yield 
matched by duration.     
Table 5 reports the results of this test, which are consistent with our main analysis.  A 
one standard deviation increase in polarization (0.54) is associated with a 17.0 basis point 
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(0.315*0.54) increase in overall yield spreads. The results indicate that the yield spreads are 
larger for bonds issued by states with high polarization.  
<Table 5> 
4.2. State Bond Yields and Polarization in the Pre and Post Insurer Downgrade Periods 
To help validate our argument that political polarization increases bond risk, we 
compare the impact of polarization on bond yields in the secondary market before and after the 
downgrade of the major insurers of state and local bonds, AMBAC and MBIA. In order to 
overcome the confounding effect of issuing new debt, we compare the yields of existing bond 
issues in the secondary market. This analysis has the advantage of identifying how political 
polarization influences risk perceptions for a constant sample of bonds. The loss of triple A 
ratings for insurers began in June 2008 when Moody’s downgraded AMBAC’s credit rating 
three notches to Aa3 from Aaa. Moody’s also downgraded the triple A rating of MBIA in June 
2008. Before the downgrade of the insurers’ ratings, we observe that bonds issued with 
insurance represent 25.7 and 34.4 percent of our sample one and two years prior to June 2008, 
respectively. After the downgrade of the major insurers’ ratings, we observe that bonds issued 
with insurance represent 9.7 and 9.0 percent of our sample one and two years after June 2008, 
respectively. These observations are consistent with the trend reported by the Bond Buyer.13 
We expect the influence of polarization on bond yields to be stronger after the deterioration of 
the bond insurers’ credit worthiness in June 2008.   
We argue that the deterioration in the ratings of the bond insurers motivated investors 
                            
13 The percentage of insured bonds decreases from 57 percent before the financial crisis to 19 percent in 2008, and to 3.5 
percent in 2012. https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/bond-insurance-then-now-the-revival-of-an-industry, accessed on Nov 
21, 2017. 
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to price more completely the risks inherent in the state governments primarily responsible for 
debt service. We argue that political polarization contributes to such risks.14 Using this setting, 
we test whether the effect of political polarization on bond yields in the secondary market is 
stronger after the downgrade than before the downgrade. We refer to the period from June 19th, 
2007 to June 18th, 2008 as the pre-downgrade period, and the period from June 19th, 2008 to 
June 19th, 2009 as the post-downgrade period. A dummy variable, Post Period, takes a value 
one if state bonds are traded in the post-downgrade period, and zero if bonds are traded in the 
pre-downgrade period. We generate interaction variables between Post Period and polarization 
and between Post Period and all control variables.   
 We utilize the OLS regression and use the bond yield as the dependent variable.  The 
model specification is shown in equation 2. Because control variables may impact yields 
differently during pre- and post-downgrade periods, we estimate a full-interaction model. We 
predict that the coefficient on the variable of political polarization and the interaction variable 
between political polarization and Post Period will be positive and statistically significant.  
This test is conducted on a matched sample of bonds that were traded during the pre-downgrade 
as well as the post-downgrade periods.     
                            
14 Gore et al. (2004) find that financial disclosures and bond insurance may be substitutes.  Cuny (2016) also indicates that 
the deterioration in credit quality of the major bond insurers increased demand for voluntary disclosures.   
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𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽8𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽10𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
+ 𝛽14𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽15𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽16𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽17𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽19𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
+ 𝛽20𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽21𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
+ 𝛽22𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽23𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
+ 𝛽24𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽25𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +  𝜀 
 (2) 
Consistent with previous studies (Harris and Piwowar, 2006; Schultz, 2012), we control 
for bond size, maturity, credit quality, credit enhancement, general obligation bonds, bonds with 
callable options, bond with puttable options, and treasury yields. Additionally, we control for 
state-level demographic variables: income per capita and population. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. 
The final sample consists of 276,766 total trades. There are 129,163 trades in the pre-
downgrade and 147,603 trades in the post-downgrade period. The average bond yield is 3.953% 
during the pre-downgrade period, and 3.902% during the post-downgrade period.  
The results contained in Table 6 show that there is a positive and statistically significant 
association between the yields and maximum political polarization values (coefficient=0.902, 
p<0.01) in the pre-downgrade period.  Additionally, the results show that the coefficient of 
interaction variable between maximum polarization and Post Period is positive and significant 
(coefficient=0.133, p<0.01), which indicates that a one standard deviation increase in 
polarization (0.54) in the post-downgrade period is associated with a 7.2 basis point (0.133 
*0.54) increase in yields compared to pre-downgrade period. We find that the association 
between the yields of municipal bonds and political polarization is higher in the post-
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downgrade period. This result provides additional support that polarization is an important 
determinant of risk in the municipal bond market.  
<Table 6> 
4.3. Impact of Political Polarization on Different Bond Types 
H2 predicts that the positive effect of polarization on bond yields will be greater for 
general obligation bonds than for revenue bonds. General obligation bonds and revenue bonds 
represent 70.6 percent and 29.3 percent of the sample, respectively. To test H2, we estimate 
regression equation 1 separately for state bonds of each type. Table 7 reports regression 
estimates for each sub-sample and for each measure of polarization.  
<Table 7> 
The results reported in Table 7 indicate that the effect of polarization on state bonds is 
concentrated in general obligation bonds. Using either measure of polarization, we find that the 
association between political polarization and bond yields for the general obligation bonds is 
positive and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increases in polarization (0.54) 
is associated with a 21.44 basis point (0.397*0.54) increase in yields for general obligation 
bonds, the repayment of which may depend on future fiscal decisions made by state legislatures. 
On the other hand, we do not find consistent evidence that political polarization influences the 
cost of borrowing for revenue bonds15 , the repayment of which depends on future project 
revenues that are largely independent of future legislative action. This pattern of effects is 
consistent with H2. 
                            
15 Revenue bonds may be influenced by the overall economic health of a state. We find that the association between 
maximum polarization and bond yields has a p-value of 0.146.  
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4.5. Additional Analysis 
4.5.1. Economic Conditions 
The political science literature suggests that political polarization might be driven by 
diminishing economic opportunity (McCarty et al. 2006 and Voorheis, McCarty, and Shor 
2017).  Although our focus is on the effects of polarization rather than its causes, it is 
important that we rule out the possibility that the positive effect of polarization on bond yields 
might be driven by omitted economic factors that are positively correlated with both 
polarization and bond risk.  In our survey of the determinants of political polarization detailed 
earlier, we believe that most explanations for polarization are largely exogenous of bond risk. 
However, Edsall (2012) indicates that economic weakness and its ensuing competition over 
diminishing resources could explain polarization. Economic deterioration could also explain 
risk associated with state government bonds. To examine if polarization is merely capturing 
this effect, we test to see if state gross domestic product (GDP) explains polarization. Four 
alternative measures of state economic conditions have been used: state GDP, percentage 
change in state GDP, GDP per capita, and percentage change in GDP per capita.  The GDP 
data are from the United States Census. The natural logarithm is applied to State GDP and GDP 
per capita before being included in our models.   
Panel A of Table 8 shows that the coefficient for political polarization is positive and 
significant, which is consistent with H1 that legislative polarization increases state bond yields. 
Our results are robust after controlling for various indicators for state economic conditions. 
<Table 8> 
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4.5.2. Income Inequality 
As discussed in section 2.2.2, the political science literature suggests that political 
polarization might be driven by income inequality (McCarty et al. 2006 and Voorheis, McCarty, 
and Shor 2017).  To rule out the possibility that income inequality is driving the impact of 
political polarization on bond yields, we re-estimate equation 1 including additional controls 
for income inequality.  We use three alternative measures of income inequality at the state 
level: Gini coefficient, Atkinson Index, Theil’s entropy index. These measures of income 
inequality are from data made available by Frank (2014).  
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results after controlling for Gini index, Atkinson Index, 
Theil’s index, respectively. We find that our results are robust to these alternative specifications. 
The coefficient for political polarization remains significant. 
 
4.5.3. Change in Income  
 As discussed in section 2.2.2, the political science literature suggests that political 
polarization might be driven by changes in economic conditions (McCarty et al. 2006 and 
Voorheis, McCarty, and Shor 2017).  To rule out the possibility of income changes driving the 
impact of political polarization on bond yields, we re-estimate equation 1 with controls for the 
change in income per capita.  The measures of income at the state level are from the United 
State Census.  We examine both change and percentage change in state income per capita, 
which is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  The natural log is applied to the change 
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in state income per capita.16  
Panel C Table 8 reports the results and shows that the coefficient for polarization is 
positive and significant, which is consistent with our main analysis that legislative polarization 
increases state bond risk and, consequently, bond yields. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using Shor and McCarty’s (2011) measure of polarization, this study examines how 
political polarization affects yields on state government bonds. Polarization measures the 
willingness of political parties to compromise and the ability of states to reach consensus on 
fiscal decisions. We find that bond yields are higher for states with higher levels of polarization 
at the legislative level and that this effect is concentrated in general obligation bonds, as 
opposed to revenue bonds, because the security of general obligation bonds is more directly 
tied to future legislative action. 
We also find that the positive association between bond yields and polarization is 
stronger after the major insurers of state and local government bonds experienced credit rating 
downgrades in June 2008. This shock suggests that the lack of high quality bond insurance 
increased investors’ exposure to risks inherent in politically polarized state legislatures.  
                            
16 The transformation takes the logarithm of the absolute value of the variable plus 1. If the original value was negative, 
"put back" the sign of the data by multiplying by –1.  
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Appendix A 
Variable Description 
Variables Name Description and Measurement 
Dependent Variables: 
Bond Yield 
(primary market) 
A bond's yield to maturity at the time of issuance. 
Bond Yield 
(secondary market) 
A bond’s yields in the secondary market. Calculated using the volume-weighted 
trade price for each bond on each date and takes into account discounts or 
premiums.   
Main Independent Variable 
Polarization The construction of the variable follows Shor and McCarty (2011) to get maximum 
level of polarization between house and senate chambers at the state level. 
Bond-Level Control Variables: 
Bank Qualified An indicator variable that takes a value of one for bonds which banks can deduct 
the interest expense for the purchase or carry of these obligations and zero 
otherwise. 
Bond Rating A numerical categorization of the bond’s credit rating assigned by the rating 
agencies. Appendix B shows the numerical classification. 
Bond Size Natural logarithm of an individual bond issue in a bond offering. 
Callable An indicator variable that takes a value of one for bonds where the issuer is 
permitted to redeem the bond between the transaction date and maturity date and 
zero otherwise. 
Competitive Bid An indicator variable that takes a value of one for bonds which the underwriter is 
engaged through a competitive offering and zero otherwise. 
GO Bond An indicator variable that takes a value of one for bonds that are general obligation 
bonds and zero otherwise. 
Insurance An indicator variable that takes a value of one for bonds with insurance and zero 
otherwise. 
Maturity The maturity of the bond, measured in years. 
Puttable An indicator variable that takes a value of one for bonds in which bondholders have 
the option to sell the security back to the issuer at a specified price and time. 
Treasury Yield Treasury yields are collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP).  They are the daily CRSP fixed-term indices for the periods 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 
20 and 30 years. We match each state bond with a Treasury bond by duration.  We 
use linear interpolation of the yields of the two Treasury bonds that have the next 
lower and higher duration relative to the respective state bond.  We delete 
observations with a duration of less than one year.  For bonds with a duration of 
more than 30 years, we use the 30-year Treasury yield. 
Volume-weighted 
Price 
Volume-weighted trade price for each bond on each date when the bond is traded.  
The variable is restricted to the trades that are customer initiated buy orders. 
State-Level Control Variables: 
Income The income per capita in a state is first deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The 
natural logarithm is then applied to the variable. 
Population The natural logarithm of a state’s population. 
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Appendix B 
Classification of Bond Ratings 
S&P Rating Numerical Code 
AAA 1 
AA+ 2 
AA 3 
AA- 4 
A+ 5 
A 6 
A- 7 
BBB+ 8 
BBB 9 
BBB- 10 
This table lists the numerical codes associated with the ratings assigned 
by S&P.  
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Table 1  
Polarization Measurement 
Year 
Maximum Polarization 
Mean Standard Deviation Number of States 
1999 1.40 0.47 49 
2000 1.41 0.47 50 
2001 1.42 0.46 50 
2002 1.43 0.46 50 
2003 1.47 0.47 50 
2004 1.48 0.46 50 
2005 1.49 0.46 50 
2006 1.49 0.46 50 
2007 1.52 0.48 50 
2008 1.52 0.48 50 
2009 1.57 0.52 32 
2010 1.55 0.49 38 
2011 1.67 0.50 46 
2012 1.68 0.49 48 
2013 1.69 0.50 49 
2014 1.69 0.51 48 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable 
  Full Sample 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
1st 
Quartile 
2nd 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Polarization   45177 1.69 0.54 0.46 3.17 1.35 1.61 1.94 
Bond Yield 45177 3.50 1.28 0.00 12.00 2.72 3.74 4.40 
Bond Size 45177 15.21 1.70 8.52 22.76 14.12 15.47 16.45 
Maturity 45177 10.34 6.21 0.52 41.75 5.30 9.54 14.54 
Rating 45177 2.76 1.45 1.00 9.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 
Insurance 45177 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GO Bond 45177 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Competitive Bid 45177 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Callable 45177 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Puttable 45177 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bank Qualified 45177 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Treasury Yield 45177 3.61 1.51 0.10 6.64 2.48 3.98 4.74 
Population 45177 15.70 1.02 13.14 17.46 15.07 15.65 16.35 
Income 45177 9.81 0.15 9.42 10.26 9.72 9.81 9.90 
Tax Rate   45177 5.66 3.34 0.00 14.10 3.60 6.13 7.83 
Adjusted Yield   269241 3.93 1.12 0.54 9.69 3.22 4.03 4.70 
This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.   
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Table 3 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable 
Bond 
Yields 
Polarization Bond size Maturity Rating Insurance GO Bond 
Competitive 
Bid 
Callable Puttable 
Bank 
Qualified 
Treasury 
Yield 
Population Income Tax Rate 
Bond Yields 1                             
Polarization -0.021* 1                           
Bond size 0.012* 0.162* 1                         
Maturity 0.631* 0.115* 0.181* 1                       
Rating 0.149* 0.345* 0.103* 0.115* 1                     
Insurance 0.21* -0.136* -0.058* 0.087* 0.124* 1                   
GO Bond -0.036* -0.047* 0.118* -0.007 0.072* -0.206* 1                 
Competitive 
Bid 
-0.167* 0.009 0.081* 0.017* -0.125* -0.095* 0.144* 1               
Callable 0.509* 0.078* 0.081* 0.767* 0.080* 0.061* 0.003 0.033* 1             
Puttable -0.005 0.014* 0.038* 0.040* 0.011* -0.013* -0.026* -0.015* 0.003 1           
Bank Qualified -0.027* -0.057* -0.136* -0.025* 0.014* 0.105* 0.011* 0.029* 0.033* 0.008 1         
Treasury Yield 0.874* -0.068* -0.039* 0.468* 0.090* 0.288* -0.011* -0.182* 0.357* 0.008 -0.022* 1       
Population 0.078* 0.534* 0.287* 0.115* 0.264* -0.069* -0.048* 0.007 0.076* 0.020* 0.036* 0.050* 1     
Income -0.098* 0.127* 0.299* 0.033* 0.130* -0.022* -0.01* 0.08* -0.001 0.003 -0.008 -0.124* 0.176* 1   
Tax Rate -0.029* 0.256* 0.038* 0.020* 0.325* -0.142* 0.028* -0.098* -0.001 0.006 -0.057* -0.035* 0.036* 0.003 1 
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Table 4 
Impact of Polarization on Bond Yields 
  Predicted Sign Coefficient T Stat 
Polarization + 0.273*** 2.73 
Bond Size - -0.008 -0.82 
Maturity + 0.052*** 20.25 
Rating + 0.102*** 3.8 
Insurance - -0.110*** -3.82 
GO Bond - -0.119** -2.25 
Competitive Bid - -0.063** -2.51 
Callable + 0.136*** 4.99 
Puttable - -1.159*** -7.8 
Bank Qualified - -0.138* -1.84 
Treasury Yield + 0.624*** 41.81 
Population - -1.005** -2.06 
Income - -0.674* -1.87 
Tax Rate +/- 0.004 0.29 
Intercept   23.421 2.41 
Year, State Dummies   Included 
N   45,177 
R-squared   87.15% 
This table shows the regression results for the impact of political polarization on bond yields.  
State and year fixed effects are included.  The standard errors are clustered at the state level.  See 
Appendix A for variable descriptions.  ***,**,* denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Impact of Polarization on Yield Spreads 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient T Stat 
Polarization + 0.315*** 2.75 
Bond Size - 0.002 0.17 
Maturity + 0.018*** 7.92 
Rating + 0.081** 2.2 
Insurance - -0.131*** -3.9 
GO Bond - -0.118** -2.05 
Competitive Bid - -0.075*** -2.86 
Callable + 0.085** 2.58 
Puttable - -1.054*** -7.28 
Bank Qualified - -0.104 -1.43 
Population - -1.13* -1.98 
Income - -0.905** -2.07 
Tax Rate +/- -0.002 -0.13 
Intercept   27.403 2.29 
Year, State Dummies   Included 
N   45,177 
R-squared   51.32% 
This table shows the regression results for the impact of political polarization on yield spreads. 
State and year fixed effects are included.  The standard errors are clustered at the state level.  See 
Appendix A for variable descriptions.  ***,**,* denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Interaction of Polarization and Bond Insurer Downgrades on Bond Yields in the Secondary Market 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
  
Coefficient T Stat 
Polarization*Post Period + 0.133*** 3.37 
Polarization + 0.902*** 3.45 
Post Period +/- -4.285** -2.19 
Bond Size - -0.043** -2.46 
Maturity + 0.056*** 21.11 
Rating +/- 0.019 1.56 
Insurance - -0.052* -1.75 
GO Bond - 0.028 0.49 
Callable + 0.494*** 15.58 
Puttable - 0.22 1.05 
Treasury Yield + 0.086*** 4.04 
Population - 0.615 0.82 
Income - 0.357 1.09 
Tax Rate +/- 0.147** 2.24 
Bond Size*Post Period +/- -0.028*** -2.71 
Maturity*Post Period +/- 0.036*** 9.03 
Rating* Post Period +/- 0.022 1.34 
Insurance*Post Period +/- 0.125** 2.11 
GO Bond*Post Period +/- -0.172** -2.58 
Callable*Post Period +/- 0.408*** 8.56 
Puttable* Post Period +/- -0.396 -1.15 
Treasury Yield*Post Period +/- -0.082* -1.88 
Population*Post Period +/- 0.061*** 2.74 
Income*Post Period +/- 0.304 1.5 
Tax Rate*Post Period +/- 0.007 0.9 
Intercept   -11.918 -1.09 
Year, State Dummies       
N   276,766 
R-squared   65.88% 
This table shows the comparable effect of political polarization on yields in the secondary market for municipal bonds before and 
after the insurer downgrades.  The dependent variable is the adjusted yield of municipal bonds in the secondary market. The 
adjusted yields are calculated using the volume-weighted trade price for each bond on each date when it is traded.  The adjusted 
yields take into account the discount and premium at which investor bought the bond.  All independent variables are interacted with 
the dummy variable, Post Period.  The adjusted yields are winsorized at 0.1%.  All models include state and year fixed effects.  
The standard errors are clustered at the state level.  See Appendix A for variable descriptions.  N is the sample size of the 
regression. R-squared represents is a goodness of fit measure.  ***,**,* represent significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th 
percentile levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Impact of Polarization on Bond Yields for Different Types of Bonds 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
General Obligation Bonds   Revenue Bonds 
Model 1   Model 2 
Coefficient T Stat   Coefficient T Stat 
Polarization + 0.397*** 2.92   0.181 1.48 
Bond Size - -0.011 -1.48   0.005 0.35 
Maturity + 0.053*** 15.50   0.048*** 12.37 
Rating + 0.122*** 4.19   -0.016 -0.50 
Insurance - -0.123*** -3.33   -0.099** -2.11 
Competitive Bid - -0.058 -1.52   -0.085** -2.35 
Callable + 0.112*** 3.12   0.196*** 5.41 
Puttable - -1.125*** -4.68   -1.042*** -7.86 
Bank Qualified - -0.106** -2.57   -0.123 -0.45 
Treasury Yield + 0.63*** 41.91   0.615*** 23.21 
Population - -1.143* -2.00   -0.574 -0.80 
Income - -0.890** -2.04   -0.864 -1.26 
Tax Rate +/-  0.023* 1.75   -0.052* -2.01 
Intercept   26.065 2.36   16.03 1.31 
Year, State Dummies   Included   Included 
N   31,914   13,263 
R-squared   88.33%   86.39% 
This table shows the regression results for the impact of political polarization on bond yields for general obligation bonds and revenue 
bonds.  Model 1 examines the impact of political polarization on bond yields for general obligation bonds.  Model 2 examines the 
impact of political polarization on bond yields for revenue bonds.  All models include state and year fixed effects.  The standard 
errors are clustered at the state level.  See Appendix A for variable descriptions.  ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
The Effect of Political Polarization with Additional Economic Controls 
                    
Panel A: Controls for State GDP               
  
Predicted 
Sign 
State GDP Percentage change in GDP GDP per capita 
Percentage change in 
GDP per capita 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient T Stat Coefficient T Stat Coefficient T Stat Coefficient T Stat 
Polarization + 0.274** 2.64 0.277*** 2.89 0.275** 2.61 0.277*** 2.85 
State GDP Metric - 0.251 0.43 -0.763 -1.56 0.066 0.21 -0.674 -1.37 
Control Variables   Included Included Included Included 
Year, State Dummies   Included Included Included Included 
N   45,147 45,147 45,147 45,147 
R-squared   87.14% 87.15% 87.14% 87.15% 
                    
Panel B: Controls for State Income Inequality               
  
Predicted 
Sign 
Gini Index Theil Index Atkinson Index 
    
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3     
Coefficient T Stat Coefficient T Stat Coefficient T Stat     
Polarization + 0.267***  2.83 0.280*** 2.77 0.287*** 2.81     
Income Inequality +/- 0.553 0.87 0.130 0.55 1.032 0.78     
Control Variables   Included Included Included     
Year, State Dummies   Included Included Included     
N   45,177 45,177 45,177     
R-squared   87.15% 87.15% 87.15%     
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Panel C: Controls for Changes in State Income               
  
Predicted 
Sign 
Change in State Income 
Per Capita 
Percentage Change in 
State Income Per Capita 
  
    
Model 1 Model 2       
Max Polarization Max Polarization       
Coefficient T Stat Coefficient T Stat         
Polarization + 0.272*** 2.73 0.272*** 2.81         
Change in State 
Income 
- 0.000 0.01 -0.800 -1.42     
    
Control Variables   Included Included       
Year, State Dummies   Included Included       
N   45,177 45,177       
R-squared   87.15% 87.16%       
This table shows the effect of political polarization on the offering yields of municipal bonds with various economic controls.  Panel A includes controls for four alternative 
measures of state economic conditions: state GDP, percentage change in state GDP, GDP per capita, and percentage change in GDP per capita.  Panel B includes controls for the 
state income inequality.  We measure income equality using three different measurements: Gini Index, Theil Index, Atkinson Index.  These measures of income inequality are 
described in Frank (2014).   Panel C includes controls for changes in state income per capita measured as either a dollar amount or percentage change.  All models include 
control variables, state and year fixed effects.  The standard errors are clustered at the state level.  See Appendix A for variable descriptions.  N is the sample size of the 
regression. R-squared represents is a goodness of fit measure. ***,**,* represent significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile levels, respectively. 
 
